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THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
\'. J.

LUND, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
-vs.-

Case No. 10015

COTTONWOOD MEADOWS
CO:\lPANY, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST.\TEl\1ENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to permanently enjoin and restrain the
respondents from building a Mobile Trailer Park in the
area known as Cottonwood Heights, which is within the
jurisdiction and under the authority of the "Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake County, Utah," also known as
Title 8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, Utah,
1953, and as amended effective June 15, 1957 (Defendant,
Exhibit # 3), and further amended on or about April 25,
1962 ( R. 37 last sentence of paragraph 7) ; to order the recall and voiding of building permit heretofore issued to the
respondents allowing them to build and establish a Mobile
Trailer Park in said area; in the alternative that in the
event respondents are entitled to receive a building permit
as applied for, that the same be restricted to and provide
that the minimum lot area for each and every dwelling
structure shall be one ( 1 ) acre.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of respondents allowing respondents to establish 205 trailer dwelling
structures on a less than 26-acre plot of land ( R. 48, R. 49,
R. 57, and R. 58).
The court's ruling was primarily based upon the finding
that the decision of the County Planning Board permitting
and allowing the respondents to proceed was not appealed
within 90 days to the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment and the appellants slept on their rights and are not in
a position to resort to the courts for the purpose of prohibiting respondents' building program.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of Summary Judgment granted to respondents
and an order directing the Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, Utah, to permanently enjoin and restrain the respondents from building a Mobile Trailer Park,
or to order the recall and voiding of the building permit
heretofore issued to the respondents allowing them to build
and establish 205 trailer dwelling structures on a less than
26-acre plot of land, or in the event it is found that respondents are entitled to receive a building permit, that the same
be restricted to and provide that the minimum lot area for
each and every dwelling structure shall be one ( 1 ) acre.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The "Uniform Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County,
Utah" a/k/a Title 8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, Utah 1953 as amended, effective June 15, 1957
(Respondents' Exhibit # 3) provides:
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8-1-3 at page 2
"In interprt'lin~ and applying the provisions of this ordinance,
the requirements contained herein are declared to be the minimum requirements for the purposes set forth."
8-1-6 (28) at page 5
"Dwelling, Any building, or portion thereof, which is designed
for use for residential purposes, except***."
8-1-6 (64) at page 9
"Structure, Anything constructed or erected, which requires
location on the ground or attached to something having a location
on the ground."
8-1-6 (68) at page 9
"Trailer Camp, Any area or tract of land used or designated to
accommodate two (2) or more automobile trailers or camping
parties."
8-1-7 at page 10
"Building Permit Required. The use of land or the construction,
alteration, repair, or removal of any building or structure or any
part thereof, as provided or as restricted in this Ordinance shall
not be commenced, or proceeded with, except after the issuance of
a written permit for the same by the County Building Inspector."
AGRICULTURAL ZONE A-2
8-26-1 at page 48
"Use Regulations. In Agricultural Zone A-2, no building,
structure or land shall be erected which is arranged, intended or
designed to be used for other than one or more of the following
uses:
(7) Trailer Camps."
8-26-2 at page 48
"Area Regulations. None, except that the minimum lot area
for any dwelling structure shall be one ( 1) acre."

Trailer camps are authorized in the following zoned
areas; A-2, A-3, C-3, M-1 and M-2 (Respondents' Exhibit
=3 at Page 12). In areas A-2 and A-3 trailer camps are
restricted to a minimum lot area for any dwelling to one
(1) acre. In areas C-3, M-1 and M-2 no such restriction
is imposed.
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Salt Lake County on or about April 25, 1962 amended
its zoning ordinances changing the classification of the area
here involved from Agricultural Zone A-2 to Residential
Zone S-1A, which amendment became effective on May 10,
1962 (R. 37).
RESIDENTIAL ZONE S-1A
8-12-1 at page 31
"In Residential Zone S-1A, no building, structure or land shall
be erected which is arranged, intended, or designated to be used
for other than one or more of the following uses:"
(MOBILE TRAILER PARKS NOT INCLUDED
OR LISTED)
8-12-2 at page 31
"Area Regulations. The minimum lot area shall not be less
than ( 1) Acre."

The following appears to be the chronological order of
happening of events in this matter: T. 100-106
January 30,
1962

February 8,
1962
March 28,
1962
April10,
1962
April18,
1962
April25,
1962
April25,
1962

Application was made by some of the appellants to
amend the Zoning from Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A which would in effect outlaw Mobile
Trailer Camps.
The contract for the purchase of the property was
executed by the respondent.
Plans for a Mobile Trailer Park were submitted to
the Planning Commission by the respondents.
Altered plans for a Mobile Trailer Park were submitted to the Planning Commission by the respondents.
Subdivision Committee of the Planning Commission approved respondents' plans on the conditions
that certain alterations be made.
A public hearing was held on appellants' application to amend the Zoning Ordinance from Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A.
The Salt Lake County Commission approved the
appellants' application to rezone the area to S-1A.
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The zoning amendment rezoning the area from
Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A became effective.
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office directed that
June 8,
the planning commission should sign and approve
1962
the respondents' applications and the building and
zoning inspection department should issue a building permit to the respondents. (Respondents' Exhibit #4)
Respondents' plans were signed by the Planning
June 12,
Commission and the same were back dated to April
1962
10, 1962 as being the approval date thereof.
Respondents' plans were approved by the Board of
July 19
Health.
1962
August 21,
Respondents' plans were approved by the County
1962
Surveyor.
September 10, Building permit was issued to Respondents.
1962
May 10,
1962

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE RE:MEDY.

The trial court erred in ruling against the appellants and
granting summary judgment for the respondents ( Memorandum Decision R. 48) and again on appellants' motion
to set aside the summary judgment (Memorandum Decision R. 57) upon the grounds that the appellants failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by not appealing the
decision of the County Planning Commission to the County
Board of Adjustment within 90 days. This is based on Sec.
17-27-16 UCA 1953 which provides in part:
''Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any
person aggrieved by his inability to obtain a building permit, or
by the decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon
or made in the course of the administration or enforcement of
the provisions of the zoning resolution. Appeals to the board of
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adjustment may be taken by any officer, department, board or
bureau of the county affected by the grant or refusal of a building
permit or by other decision of an administrative officer or agency
based on or made in the course of the administration or enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution. The time within
which such appeal must be made, and the form or other procedure relating thereto, shall be as specified in the general rules
provided in writing by the board of county commissioners to
govern the procedure of such board of adjustment or in the supplemental rules of procedure adopted by such board provided
further, that said rules and regulations shall be available to the
public at the office of the county commissioners at all time...."
(Emphasis added)

The County Commissioners in response to this section,
have adopted the following rule of procedure:
"An appeal to the Board of Adjustment must be taken within
ninety ( 90) days after the cause arises or the appeal will not be
considered by the Board of Adjustment."

The appellants have no argument with the general rule
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, but assert that it
is a rule with many limitations and exceptions and is not
applicable in this case for many reasons. First, the cases
indicate that when it would appear that the administrative
remedy would be fruitless because the administrative body
would be powerless to afford relief, then the appeal would
be unnecessary. 42 Am. Jur. Public Administrative Law,
Sec. 200, Pg. 585. The Board of Adjustment can grant adjustments or variances under the ordinance, but appellants
assert that under the law, the Board does not have the
power to say that an ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable
or that an ordinance is invalid or that a building permit
granted under an ordinance that has been amended would
be invalid for, in effect, the Board would be ruling on the
validity of the new ordinance. This is what the Board of
Adjustment would have to do in this case for the building
permit was issued in violation of the new ordinance. This
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raises the legal question as to whether the old ordinance or
the amended ordinance is applicable and this can only be
decided by a judicial tribunal. Provo City vs. Claudin,
63 P.2d 570, Conlan v. Board of Public Works, 94 A. 20,
660.
The doctrine applies where the express terms of the statute makes the exhaustion of the administrative remedy a
condition precedent to the right to bring a court action.
However, the doctrine does not apply where the terms of
the statute either expressly or by implication makes the
bringing of the administrative remedy permissible only,
which would indicate that the legislature intended to allow
a judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy
had not been exhausted. This would mean that the parties
would be given an election of remedies either administrative or judicial. 42 Am. Jur. Public Administrative Law,
Sec. 199, Pg. 583. Security First National Bank v. Los Angeles County, 217 P.2d 946, Coyle v. Erie R. Co., 59 A.2d
817, McMasters v. Owen, 81 N.Y.S.2d 564.
I refer the court to Sec. 17-27-16 which is quoted on
page 5 of this brief, especially to the italicized portions
which provide "appeals to the board of adjustments may be
taken'' and again further down "appeals to the board of
adjustments may be taken." This does not say "shall" or
"must'' be taken, but "may" which is permissive and not
mandatory language in statutory construction.
The legislature realized and intended this for they provided another remedy under Sec. 17-27-28 which states:
"It shall be unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter,
maintain or use any building or structure or to use any land in
vi~lation of any regulation in, or any provision of, any zoning resolutwn, or any amendment thereof, enacted or adopted by any
board of county commissioners under the authority of the act.
Any person, firm or corporation violating any regulation in, or of
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any provision of, any zoning resolution, or any amendment of this
act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In case any building or
structure is or is proposed to be erected, constructed, reconstructed,
altered, maintained or used, or any land is or is proposed to be
used, in violation of this act or of any regulation or provision of
any resolution, or amendment thereof, enacted or adopted by any
board of county commissioners under the authority granted by this
act, such board, the district attorney of the county or any owner
of real estate within the district in which such building~ structure
or land is situated~ may~ in addition to other remedies provided by
law~ institute injunction~ mandamus~ abatement or any other appropriate action or actions~ proceeding or proceedings to prevent,
enjoin~ abate or remove such unlawful erection~ construction~ reconstruction~ alteration~ maintenance or use." (Emphasis added)

You will note that this gives a judicial action in addition
to "other remedy provided by law" or the permissive appeal to the Board of Adjustment. The case at hand is clearly
a case where the appellants had an election of remedies,
and they chose to resort to the courts. Even if the court finds
that the appellants should have appealed to the Board of
Adjustment, the appellants are now barred by the 90-day
limitation laid down by the Board of County Commissioners
so the appellants' administrative remedy has now been exhausted, and they would have the right to bring an original
action as provided for in Sec. 17-27-23.
Appellants also contend that they have a right to bring
an appeal for the Board would not have jurisdiction to hear
the matter since the appellants are not "persons aggrieved"
as required in Sec. 17-27-16.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Clark v.
Warner, 204 P. 929, had the question come before them as
to what "person aggrieved" meant. The court held:
"Webster's International Dictionary defined 'aggrieved' as follows:
'Adversely affected in respect of legal rights; suffering from an
infringement or denial of legal rights.'
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Bouvier's Law Dictionary defined "aggrieved" as follows:
'Having a grievance, or suffered loss or injury. The parties
aggrieved are those against whom an appealable order or judgment has been entered. One cannot be said to be aggrieved
unless error has been committed against him.'
A person cannot be said to be aggrieved when they are only remotely or indirectly affected by the decision or action of the board
of county commissioners. In a civil action the persons who may be
aggrieved by the decision of the court are the parties to the action,
the real parties in interest. The one aggrieved is the one against
whom a judgment or decision is rendered or order made ... "

See also, 20 C.J.S., County, Sec. 95.
In this case the appellants are not aggrieved by any action of the Board, for action was not taken directly against
them. They are not appealing from any decision for they
have not been parties to any action, but are instituting an
action in the first instance as owners of real estate under Sec.
17-27-23.
POINT II
THE BUILDING PERMIT ISSUED TO THE RESPONDENTS
I~ VIOLATION OF THE EXISTING ZONING ORDINANCE
IS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT
ACQUIRE ANY VESTED RIGHTS EVEN THOUGH THEY
~1.\ Y HAVE ACTED IN RELIANCE ON SAID PERMIT.

Appellants call the Court's attention to the fact that the
plans were actually signed by the Planning Commission,
approved by the Board of Health, approved by the County
Surveyor, and the Building Permit was issued after the ordinance \\"as amended, all this being done in violation of the
then existing zoning ordinance. The Utah Code Annotated
1963, Sec. 17-27-12 provides in part:
·•... such building inspector s~1all not issue any permit unless the
plans of and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration~ or use fully conform to all zoning regulations then
in effect."
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This section specifically provides that a building permit
shall not be issued unless the plans conform to the ordinance
then in effect, and in this case the new ordinance had gone
into effect so the plans did not conform and the permit
should not have been issued. A permit issued in violation
of law is null and void and confers no vested rights on the
holder even though the holder acts in reliance on the permit. 101 C.J.S. Zoning, Sec. 238 Pg. 1001 provides:
"Generally, an unauthorized permit or certificate, or one which
violates, or does not comply with, the zoning laws or ordinances is
void, or a nullity, and confers no rights on the permittee ... and
does not bind the municipality in any respect, even though the
permittee may have commenced building operation, or otherwise
incurred expenses or obligation thereunder .... An unauthorized
permit does not constitute a basis for estoppel, or prejudice or
destroy the rights of the public to require the enforcement of zoning laws valid on their face."

See also 58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 184.
In the case of Underhill v. Board of Appeals, 72 N.Y.S.2d
588, action was brought by a group of property owners
against the Board of Appeals for granting a building permit
for the building of an airport, one of the bases of the action
being that the permit was issued in violation of the zoning
ordinance. The permittee went to a great deal of expense
in constructing an aviation field, hangars, office building,
gasoline pumps, etc. The court in ruling for the petitioners
quoted from Judge Cardoza to the effect that when the
permit was revoked by the court, it returned the parties to
the position they were before the issuance of the permit,
that the establishment of the airport and structure were
illegal and the permittees did not acquire any vested rights
to maintain their structures or continue operation even
though they acted under the permit. In effect, it was as if a
permit had never been granted. The Supreme Court of
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Alabama in the case of Board of Zoning Adjustments v.
Boykin, 92 So.2d 906 held:
"When a building permit is issued in violation of the zoning ordinann· it is invalid, and the permittee acquires no vested rights
thereunder and this although the permittee has incurred expense
in connection therewith and in reliance thereon. (citation omitted)
And one to whom a building permit has been illegally issued cannot successfully invoke the doctrine of estoppel so as to preclude
the municipality from revoking the permit, notwithstanding the
fact that the permittee may have acted in good faith and may have
expended money or incurred obligation in reliance upon the permit. (citationsomitted)"

I refer the court to the case of McCarty v. Schuette,
24 N.W.2d 244 where the plaintiff who was an adjoining
property owner to the defendant brought action against
him for building a garage in violation of the zoning ordinance even though the defendant was acting under a building permit. The court held that the permit offered no protection because the garage was in violation of the ordinance
and it was proper for plaintiff to maintain this action. The
Florida court in the case of Miami Shore Village v. Wm. N.
Brockway, Post., 24 So.2d 33 held that a permit issued in
violation of law confers no right because every person is
presumed to know the nature and extent of the powers of
the municipal office. This was after the permittee had gone
to a great deal of expense of obtaining plans, excavating,
purchasing material and pouring a foundation. A permit
issued in violation of an existing zoning ordinance was held
to be null and void and the governmental powers may not
be forfeited by the action of the local office in disregard of
the ordinance in the case of V. F. Yahodiakin Engineering
Corporation v. Zoning Board of Adjustments, 86 A.2d 127.
The Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake County,
Sec. 8-1-1 0 provides :
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"Licensing. All departments, officials and public employees of Salt
Lake County which are vested with the duty of authority to issue
permits or licenses shall conform to the provisions of this Title and
shall issue no permit or license for use, building or purpose where
the same would be in conflict with the provisions of this Title, and
any such permit or license, if issued in conflict with the provisions
of this Title shall be null and void."

The Court should find that the respondents' permit
issued after the ordinance was amended is null and void
and was never a valid permit.
POINT III
THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT OBTAIN ANY VESTED
RIGHTS UPON THE FILING OF AN APPLICATION FOR A
BUILDING PERMIT FOR WHEN THE ORDINANCE WAS
AMENDED THE AMENDMENT BECAME CONTROLLING
AND RIGHTS COULD NOT VEST.

The cases hold that zoning regulations are not regarded
as contracts made by the municipality with the land owner
and may be modified at any time. Also, that property
owners do not obtain a vested right as a result of a zoning ordinance which would preclude a future amendment
to the ordinance and that the governmental body is not
estopped from enforcing any change in the ordinance. Case
v. City of Los Angeles, 298 P.2d 50, Taylor v. City of Hackinsack, 5 A.2d 788.
The great majority of the cases hold that if an ordinance
is amended while an application for a permit is pending
that the application will be controlling. 169 A.L.R. 584,
75 A.L.R.2d 236, 101 C.J.S. Zoning, Sees. 90 and 221, 58
Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 182. In the Maryland case of the
Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, 46 A.2d 689,
the Defendant on September 7th purchased property, had
plans prepared by an architect, and spent several thousands
of dollars in grading and preparing the land to build a busiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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nrss building which was in compliance with the then existing ordinance. On October 7th and again on November
17th, Defendant made application for a building permit.
Certain residents became aware of the situation and protested the issuance of the permit. The permit was denied
on December 5th pursuant to an amendment of the zoning ordinance on November 28th. The court in holding
that the city had the right to amend the zoning ordinance
even after the application had been filed stated:
"But it does not follow that the proposed business in the case at bar
was established or existing. No permit was issued, and if it had
been, it would have conferred no vested rights, nor would it have
created any estoppel. (citations omitted) A mere intention to use
of the business in the particular zone .... "

In the case of Re Town Board v. Huntington, 214
N.Y.S.2d 164, an application was made to extend the business use of certain property as was then permitted by the
zoning ordinance and upon the granting of the application
the town appealed and during the time of the appeal
amended the ordinance prohibiting the extending business
use. The court held:
"The right to an extension did not vest, and this appeal must be
decided upon the law as it now exists."

See also Re Dengles, 160 N.Y.S.2d 83, Harrison Ridge
Associates Corporation v. Sforza, 179 N.Y.S.2d 547.
Also, the court, in the case of Rodu v. Lee, 81 A.2d 517,
held that the law in effect at the time of the decision of the
court is controlling for the court stated:
"The first question is whether or not the zoning ordinance, as it
existed ... when the applications for the permits were filed, or
whether the zoning ordinance as subsequently amended, is controlling. The law as it exists at the time of the decision in the
instant proceeding is controlling. Concord apartments vs. Board
of Adjustments, 1 N. J. Super. 301, 64 A. 2d 355. (App. Div.
1949) ."
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I call the Court's attention to the chronology of events
which are listed under the facts, particularly to the fact that
an application for the change of zoning was filed on January
30, 1962 and the application for a building permit was not
filed until March 28, 1962. If the rights vest in either party
they would vest first in those who were first to file an application for the zoning amendment. They had the right to
have their application acted on and decided before action
was taken on respondents' subsequent application.
However, as in most fields of the law, there are limitations to the general rule, those being if before the ordinance
is amended a party substantially changes his position in
reliance on the ordinance, or if only ministerial acts are left
to be performed before a permit is issued. The respondents
were negotiating on the property in January but did not
execute the contract for the purchase of the property until
February 8, 1962 which was during the time the change of
zoning application was pending. A public hearing on the
zoning application was held on April25, 1962 and the ordinance was amended on May 10, 1962. Four months after
this on September 10, 1962, the building permit was issued.
The respondents surely had knowledge of the happenings
of these events and cannot now be heard to say that they
changed their position in reliance on the former ordinance.
Any expenses they incurred was at their own risk.
Respondents in their argument before the court (T.125)
refers to the ministerial limitation and cite the case of State
v. City of Bellvue, 275 P.2d 899 as authority. In the Bellvue
case the City refused to grant a permit for business because
the applicant failed to provide off-street parking. The applicant cured this defect and the city still refused on the
grounds that the off-street parking did not represent the
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highest and best use to which the property could be put.
The applicant sought a writ of mandate compelling the issuance of the permit and the city responded by then attempting to rezone the area. On appeal, the court held for the
applicant. There may have been only a ministerial act left
to be performed in the Bellvue case, but in the case at hand,
there was an application to amend the ordinance staring the
Board in the face, which they must rule on prior to issuing
a building permit, and approval still had to be obtained
from the County Surveyor and Board of Health, so you can
hardly say that there was only a ministerial act left to be
performed. The Bellvue case is certainly distinguishable on
its facts and is not in point with the case before this court,
which case falls within the rule followed by the overwhelming majority of the cases.
If we look at this in the light most favorable to therespondents and assume that the approval of the plans and
the issuance of the building permit were valid, then the
question arises as to what effect the zoning amendment has
on the permit and what rights, if any, an applicant acquires
if he obtains approval and then the ordinance is amended.
The general rule is set forth in 58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 185,
which provides:
''A number of cases sustain the express or implied revocation of a
building permit where, subsequent to its issuance, the city passes
a valid ordinance which has the effect of prohibiting the erection
of a building such as the one in question, and, under some decisions, this is true even though the grantee of the permit has entered
. into contracts, bought material, or incurred other expenses. This
rule has been applied in the case of a subsequent zoning ordinance
or amendment thereof, and it is held that the grant of a permit or
license does not preclude the application thereto of a new zoning
regulation prohibiting the erection of the building or the operation
of the business in the particular zone ...."
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Cases support the general rule to the effect that municipalities through their police power may impliedly revoke an
existing building permit by amending the existing ordinance, for the California Court in the case of Miller v.
Board of Public Works, 234 P. 381, held:
"No point is made that the Board has not the power to revoke a
permit once it has been duly issued, nor that the ordinance if
valid, may not operate retroactively to nullify a permit previo~sly
issued."

Seealso40A.L.R. 732.
In the case of Geneva Investment Company v. City of
St. Louis, Missouri, 87 F.2d 83, where the applicant, on
November 18, obtained a permit to construct a filling station and on December 6th, the ordinance was amended,
the court held :
"The building permits created no vested right, but were subject to
revocation by the proper exercise of police power. The amending ordinance had the effect of revoking the permits. (citations
omitted) ... The loss sustained by appellant through depreciation
of value, if the ordinance is sustained, while proper for consideration by the court, is not controlling, for if the police power is properly exercised, loss to the individual is a misfortune which he must
undergo as a member of society."
POINT IV
THAT IF THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
BUILDING PERMIT, THE SAME SHOULD BE RESTRICTED
TO AND PROVIDE THAT THE MINIMUJ\tf LOT AREA FOR
EACH AND EVERY DWELLING STRUCTURE SHOULD BE
ONE ( 1) ACRE.

The lower court chose to ignore the fact that on January
30, 1962 application was made by some of the citizens of the
area to rezone the area from Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A which by deleting "trailer camps" did "outlaw"
the same prior to any application made by the respondents.
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The lower court chose to ignore the fact that the respondents who had made application for a permit and were
parties to the proceedings slept on their rights by not appealing, within ninety (90) days as required by the rule of
procedure of the Board of County Commissioners, therezoning to S-1A which became effective and law on May 10,
1962, prior to the respondents being granted a building
permit.
The lower court chose to ignore the fact that the area
now supports a $125,000.00 Country Club, numerous
above-average residential homes built in platted subdivisions serviced with sewer, gas and electricity all being installed primarily for residential purposes and hardly for
agricultural endeavors.
The lower court chose to ignore that "trailer camps" in
an agricultural area such as A-2 and A-3 would contemplate the same being sheepherder camps or cattle camps
and not Mobile Trailer Park or tourist camps which would
be permissible in areas such as C-3, M-1, and M-2 where
they would not be limited to one ( 1 ) acre lots.
The lower court chose to ignore the great and important
investment that the residential home owners, as represented
by the appellants, have invested in their homes and the
area; the school and church problems that would arise and
the tax impact imposed upon such an agricultural area
under Zoning A-2 or the residential area under Zoning
S-1A.
Instead the lower court chose to see: That it is just and
reasonable to impose upon a property owner who would
wish to build a home for his family without wheels attached
to it that he be restricted for the good of the public to not
less than a one ( 1 ) acre plot of ground for each "dwelling
structure," while if he attaches wheels to the side of his
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"dwelling structure" he could put as many on one ( 1) acre
of ground as he wished.
That the appellants had acquired no vested rights by
the fact that some of the residents had applied for rezoning
prior to the respondents applying for a building permit and
the area was in fact, rezoned prior to the issuance of the
building permit.
That it was not necessary for the respondents to administratively appeal the rezoning to S-1A within 90 days even
though the same became effective and law before therespondents were granted a building permit, but that the appellants who were not aggrieved party and some of whom
were not even on the application for the zoning change
slept on their rights by not appealing.
It is submitted that if the area had not been rezoned
from Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A the respondents
would not have been entitled to place more than one ( 1)
dwelling structure on one ( 1 ) acre of land and should not
be allowed to place 205 trailer dwelling structures on a less
than 26-acre plot of land as they now contemplated doing.
The only difference is that the trailer dwelling structure
would have some wheels attached while a substantial brick
home would not, for both would be using the same light,
gas, sewer, and school facilities.
CONCLUSION
That this court should reverse the decision of the lower
court and find for the appellant and against the respondent.
HAROLD N. WILKINSON
HOMER F. WILKINSON
GEORGE H. SEARLE

Attorneys for Appellant
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